Several AOS-CX switches are responding to SNMPv2 GET requests for the public community. The customer only permits SNMPv3. You have asked a network admin to fix this problem. The admin says, ''I tried to remove the community, but the CLI output an error.''
What should you recommend to remediate the vulnerability and meet the customer's requirements?
This is because SNMPv3 is a secure version of SNMP that provides authentication, encryption, and access control for network management. SNMPv3-only is a configuration option on AOS-CX switches that disables SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c, which are insecure versions of SNMP that use plain text community strings for authentication. By setting the snmp-server settings to ''snmpv3-only'', the switch will only respond to SNMPv3 requests and reject any SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c requests, thus remedying the vulnerability and meeting the customer's requirements.
A) Enabling control plane policing to automatically drop SNMP GET requests. This is not a valid recommendation because control plane policing is a feature that protects the switch from denial-of-service (DoS) attacks by limiting the rate of traffic sent to the CPU. Control plane policing does not disable SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c, but rather applies a rate limit to all SNMP requests, regardless of the version. Moreover, control plane policing might also drop legitimate SNMP requests if they exceed the rate limit, which could affect the network management.
C) Adding an SNMP community with a long random name. This is not a valid recommendation because an SNMP community is a shared secret that acts as a password for accessing network devices using SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c. Adding an SNMP community with a long random name does not disable SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c, but rather creates another community string that can be used for authentication. Moreover, adding an SNMP community with a long random name does not improve the security of SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c, as the community string is still transmitted in plain text and can be intercepted by an attacker.
D) Enabling SNMPv3, which implicitly disables SNMPv1/v2. This is not a valid recommendation because enabling SNMPv3 does not implicitly disable SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c on AOS-CX switches. Enabling SNMPv3 only adds support for the secure version of SNMP, but does not remove support for the insecure versions. Therefore, enabling SNMPv3 alone does not remedy the vulnerability or meet the customer's requirements.
A customer's admins have added RF Protect licenses and enabled WIDS for a customer's AOS 8-based solution. The customer wants to use the built-in capabilities of APs without deploying dedicated air monitors (AMs). Admins tested rogue AP detection by connecting an unauthorized wireless AP to a switch. The rogue AP was not detected even after several hours.
What is one point about which you should ask?
RF Protect is a feature that enables wireless intrusion detection and prevention system (WIDS/WIPS) capabilities on AOS 8-based solutions. WIDS/WIPS allows detecting and mitigating rogue APs, unauthorized clients, and other wireless threats. RF Protect requires RF Protect licenses to be installed and WIDS to be enabled on the Mobility Master (MM).
To use the built-in capabilities of APs for WIDS/WIPS, without deploying dedicated air monitors (AMs), admins need to set at least one radio on each AP to air monitor mode. Air monitor mode allows the AP to scan the wireless spectrum and report any wireless activity or anomalies to the MM. Air monitor mode does not affect the other radio on the AP, which can still serve clients in access mode. By setting at least one radio on each AP to air monitor mode, admins can achieve full coverage and visibility of the wireless environment and detect rogue APs.
If admins do not set any radio on the APs to air monitor mode, the APs will not scan the wireless spectrum or report any wireless activity or anomalies to the MM. This means that the APs will not be able to detect rogue APs, even if they are connected to the same network. Therefore, admins should check whether they have set at least one radio on each AP to air monitor mode.
You are setting up Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) to enforce EAP-TLS authentication with Active Directory as the authentication source. The company wants to prevent users with disabled accounts from connecting even if those users still have valid certificates.
As the first part of meeting these criteria, what should you do to enable CPPM to determine where accounts are enabled in AD or not?
Refer to the scenario.
A customer is migrating from on-prem AD to Azure AD as its sole domain solution. The customer also manages both wired and wireless devices with Microsoft Endpoint Manager (Intune).
The customer wants to improve security for the network edge. You are helping the customer design a ClearPass deployment for this purpose. Aruba network devices will authenticate wireless and wired clients to an Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) cluster (which uses version 6.10).
The customer has several requirements for authentication. The clients should only pass EAP-TLS authentication if a query to Azure AD shows that they have accounts in Azure AD. To further refine the clients' privileges, ClearPass also should use information collected by Intune to make access control decisions.
You are planning to use Azure AD as the authentication source in 802.1X services.
What should you make sure that the customer understands is required?
What is a common characteristic of a beacon between a compromised device and a command and control server?
A beacon is a type of network traffic that is sent from a compromised device to a command and control (C2) server, which is a remote system that controls the malicious activities of the device . A beacon is used to establish and maintain communication between the device and the C2 server, as well as to receive instructions or exfiltrate data .
A common characteristic of a beacon is that it is periodic, meaning that it is sent at regular intervals, such as every few minutes or hours . This helps the C2 server to monitor the status and availability of the device, as well as to avoid detection by network security tools .
Another common characteristic of a beacon is that it is small and identically sized, meaning that it contains minimal or fixed amount of data, such as a simple acknowledgment or a random string . This helps the device to conserve bandwidth and resources, as well as to avoid detection by network security tools .
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